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Abstract 
 
The attention to board of directors in small firms is increasing. Traditionally they have 
been considered to be passive and labeled paper boards or aunt boards. However, boards in 
small firms are now undergoing major changes. In this paper we test hypotheses of what 
makes boards active and allows them to contribute to value creation. Activity is seen in 
relation to board task involvement. Predictions based on agency theory, resource dependence 
theory and the resource based view of the firm are used to explore board task involvement. In 
a sample of 347 small firms we got strong support for hypotheses highlighting the use of the 
knowledge of the board members and various board maintenance tools, such as regular 
board evaluations, to increase board task involvement. Various contextual variables were 
included as control variables, but few were significantly related to board task involvement. 
Actionable advice to boards in small firms is provided. 
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1.  Boards in Small Firms: What Makes them Active? 
 
Our purpose with this paper is to explore what makes boards in small firms 
active. Research on boards and governance has increased during the recent years, 
but we still know relatively little about governance and boards in small firms 
(Fiegener, 2005; Huse, 2000). It is widely acknowledged that small firms have 
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certain characteristics that make them a special case of governance in need of 
particular attention (Cowling, 2003; Huse, 2000). The typical overlap of governance 
structures (Brunninge et al., 2006) and the lack of functional managerial competence 
(Cowling, 2003) are only two examples of such characteristics.  
Some research exists on the roles that boards can play in small firms (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004; Dyer, 1986; Fiegener, 2005). However, boards in these firms are 
often considered to be legal bodies with limited importance. Such boards are usually 
referred to as ‘paper boards’ (Dyer, 1986) or ‘aunt boards’ (Huse, 2003), since they 
are typically composed of persons close to the owner-manager that are willing to 
lend their name to meet legal requirements.  
Small firms are like the larger firms experiencing increasing pressures to activate 
their boards for value creation (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Nordqvist & Melin, 
2002). The lack of research addressing what actually makes boards in small firms 
active and contributing to value creation is therefore a significant limitation of the 
current literature. We especially know little about how factors beyond the traditional 
contextual variables, CEO attributes and board composition (Daily, Dalton & 
Cannella, 2003; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999) affect board 
activity in small firms. Few studies have for instance explored the impact that the 
use of the board members’ knowledge and skills (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 
2000; Zona & Zattoni, 2007), their intrinsic motivation (Borch & Huse, 1993; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988, 1991), and the board development tools like board 
evaluation (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Minichilli, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2007) 
have on board activity.  
Board activity has in earlier studies been defined as the number of outside board 
members and the number of board meetings. However, in this paper we argue that 
these proxies do not fully grasp board activity and in particular board value creating 
activities. We therefore mainly use an alternative construct - board task involvement 
- as a measure of board activity. Various board tasks have theoretically been argued 
to have value creating contributions (Huse, 2005; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; 
Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, forthcoming) and board task involvement refers to the 
extent to which the board as a group is involved in these tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999; Huse, 2005; Pearce & Zahra, 1991). Task involvement may directly be related 
to value creation (Huse, 2005) and various theoretical perspectives emphasize 
different board tasks such as control, service and strategy (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Arguments from agency theory, resource dependence theory and the resource based 
view of the firm highlight the importance of different board tasks. In this study we 
test in a sample of small firms how predictions from these theories explain board 
task involvement. 
Both empirical and theoretical contributions are made. First, we explore how 
traditional predictors explain board task involvement in small firms. Research on 
boards has mostly been about large and publicly traded corporations, and the most 
used predicting variables, ‘the usual suspects’ (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003), have 
been the number of board members, CEO duality, outsider ratio and the 
shareholding of the board members. Second, we go beyond these variables and 
M. HUSE - A. MINICHILLI - M. NORDQVIST - A. ZATTONI 19 
explore the importance of the intrinsic motivation of board members (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; 1991; 1998). The basic argument is that 
it is not enough for board members to have knowledge and skills, but they also need 
to use them (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Third, we explore how some board 
structures recommended in the current practitioner oriented literature affect board 
activity. The introduction of regular board evaluations (Behan, 2004; Huse, 
Minichilli & Schoning, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2007) and the allocation of more time 
during board meetings (Demb & Neubauer, 1992) are two such recommendations. 
This means that we contribute to what boards themselves can control and change to 
increase board task involvement. Compared to the dominant approach in the 
literature, this provides a more flexible and less deterministic notion of board work 
in small firms. We are therefore able to provide actionable advice to small firm 
owner-managers that consider activating their board.  
The article is structured as follows. First we present a brief introduction of board 
tasks in small firms before we position the empirical study in relation to the ‘usual 
suspects’, board member motivation and board structures. Seven hypotheses are 
formulated. Then, we present our sample, the methods we used to collect and 
analyse the data and how we operationalized our variables. After presenting the 
results, a discussion is provided before the article ends with our key conclusions, 
suggestions for future research and practical implications.  
 
 
2.  Boards in the Small Firm: Theory and Hypotheses 
 
In the governance literature the rationale for having boards of directors is 
associated with value creation and different tasks, where the tasks are often related 
to specific theoretical perspectives (e.g. Johnson et al., 1996; McNulty & Pettigrew, 
1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Agency theory is typically associated with control 
tasks and has its roots in the separation of ownership and control in large 
corporations. The control tasks broadly refer to monitoring on behalf of shareholders 
and other stakeholders. It has been argued that board members are less involved in 
control tasks in small firms (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 
2000) than in large corporations. However, further agency theory reasoning and 
empirical evidence have shown that also boards in small firms may be involved in 
control tasks (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005)  
Resource dependence theory (Daily et al., 2003; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) is about resource provision and is associated with how boards and 
board members provide service through networks and legitimacy to the firm and the 
top management.  
The resource and knowledge-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004) supports a third main task of the board – strategy. 
From this perspective, the tasks of the board go beyond ratifying and controlling 
strategic decisions. They also include involvement in formulating the context and 
content of strategies, as well as being involved in the conduct of strategies (McNulty 
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& Pettigrew, 1999). The service and strategy tasks are considered to be particularly 
relevant in the context of small firms (Brunninge et al., 2006; Castaldi & Wortman, 
1984).  
 
Board Composition and the ‘Usual Suspects’ 
 
The four dominating variables in board research are the number of board 
members, the insider/outsider ratio, CEO duality and shareholding by board 
members. These have been labeled as ‘the usual suspects’ (Finkelstein & Mooney, 
2003) and researchers have been encouraged to find new variables to advance the 
knowledge about boards. However, as boards in small firms have received only 
limited attention, it is still relevant to test hypotheses between the ‘usual suspects’ 
and board task involvement. 
The first and most studied ‘usual suspect’ is the board size. The number of board 
members is generally expected to have an inverse U-form relationship to firm 
performance (Zahra et al., 2000). Optimal board size is often considered to be 
between five and eight members. Many small firm boards have fewer members and 
are dominated by owner-managers’ families and friends or professional advisors 
(e.g. accountants or attorney).  
This may lead to limited board member independence and vigilance. From this 
perspective, increasing the number of board members increases the ability of the 
board to both service and control the top management. Resource dependence theory 
further suggests that a large board provides access to a wider range of useful 
resources external to the firm. Cowling (2003) finds that the number of board 
members in small firms is positively related to board activity. In other words, 
predictions from both agency theory and resource dependence theory lead us to 
suggest the following hypotheses:  
 
H1  There is a positive relationship between the number of board members and 
board task involvement. 
From an agency theory perspective, the insider/outsider ratio is used to measure 
board independence. Top management team members and their families are usually 
considered to be financially and psychologically dependent on the CEO. As such 
they are considered as insiders, and they are not expected to have sufficient distance 
to control managerial behavior and opportunism.  
Earlier studies have shown that outsiders can make boards in small firms more 
active (Cowling, 2003; Johannisson & Huse, 2000). From a resource dependence 
perspective, the inclusion of non-executive board members may increase the 
availability of resources for a firm, and the number of outsiders will thus 
accordingly be positively related to board task involvement (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Outside directors have thus potentially large contributions in small firms regardless 
of the theoretical perspectives employed (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005). This is the 
case for family businesses and venture-capital financed firms, as well as for other 
small firms. We thus hypothesize:  
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H2 There is a positive relationship between the ratio of outside board members and 
board task involvement. 
CEO duality exists when the CEO is also the board chairperson. It has been 
argued in the leadership literature that CEO duality may be positively related to firm 
performance because it secures unitary leadership. However, a core element in 
agency theory is the separation of control and executive tasks. Agency theory 
predictions will include a negative relationship between CEO duality and control 
tasks. CEO duality is particularly common in small firms as a result of the overlap 
between the owners, the board members and the top management team. Boards are 
expected to be less active and more informal when there is CEO duality (Nordqvist 
& Melin, 2002). Zahra et al. (2000) also found that CEO duality was negatively 
related to corporate innovation in medium-sized companies. Therefore:  
 
H3  There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and board task 
involvement. 
In the agency theory literature, shareholding by board members is considered to 
be one of the main criteria for board task involvement and in particularly board 
control involvement (Kosnik, 1987; 1990). Board members’ shareholding is 
believed to increase their motivation to get involved in control, service and strategy 
tasks (Johnson et al., 1993; Zahra et al., 2000; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Shareholding 
board members, since they benefit from the firm’s increased value-creation, are 
more prone to challenge the CEO and to seek in-depth knowledge about the firm and 
its environment (Zahra et al., 2000). This leads us to formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4  There is a positive relationship between shareholding by the board members 
and board task involvement. 
 
Board Members’ Intrinsic Motivation 
 
It is not enough that board members have knowledge and skills (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). They must also be motivated to use it. There are various reasons for 
board members to be active. Board shareholding, liability and personal or 
professional standards are suggested to be the most important motivational issues 
relating to board task involvement (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1991). Shareholding is one of the usual suspects and it is included in hypothesis 4. 
Liability issues are first of all related to firms in financial crisis. Personal and 
professional standards are related to the market for board members and managers. 
The reputation of the board members will increase and their value in the market for 
board members and managers will also increase if they do a good job, but at the 
same time it will be at risk if they fail. From a resource dependence perspective, this 
may be especially relevant for outside board members since they use their 
reputation, networks and expertise to provide access to resources available outside 
of the firm (Borch & Huse, 1993). Moreover, in small firms the often close and 
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long-lasting ties between board members, managers and owners may mean that they 
feel more related to and identify more with the owner-family (Huse, 1993). This 
typically increases their motivation to be involved in board tasks. Gabrielsson & 
Winlund (2000) found evidence that in small firms committed and motivated board 
members mean greater involvement in both service and control tasks. Based on 
these theoretical and empirical arguments we therefore hypothesize:  
 
H5 There is a positive relationship between board members’ personal and 
professional motivation and board task involvement. 
 
Board Working Structures  
 
Boards in small firms typically meet only a few times every year, and the 
number of hours devoted to each board meeting is limited. However, for a board to 
perform well it is not enough to have the very best and competent board members. 
The board members and the board must also have a working style or working 
structure that allows the board members to use their knowledge and skills (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). The 
amount of time devoted to actual board work can significantly determine the degree 
to which boards fulfill their tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989). An active board requires time for preparation and careful planning, but the 
number of hours spent in each board meeting is also considered to be important for 
board task involvement (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Huse, 2003), and in particular for 
board strategy and service involvement (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Spending 
time together in board meetings is an essential ingredient for virtuous boardroom 
dynamics and a creative and innovative board behavior. Time is often a main 
constraint for many board members, and in particular for board members who are 
CEOs of other companies. As stated by agency theory, these may spend sufficient 
time on quantitatively related control tasks, but other board tasks will be expected to 
suffer due to time constraints (Brunninge et al., 2006; Hitt et al., 1996). Longer 
meetings also support process-orientation and a board climate where many actors 
can voice their opinions (Huse et al., 2005). Outside board members cannot be 
expected to monitor the firm (Demb & Neubauer, 1992), be involved in strategic 
issues or reach effective decisions (Conger et al., 1998) if not given enough time in 
the board meetings to discuss and evaluate various alternatives. Therefore:  
 
H6 There is a positive relationship between the length of the board meetings and 
board task involvement. 
It has been argued that regular board evaluations positively support board task 
involvement (Conger et al., 1998; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch, 1995; 
Minichilli et al., 2007). Board evaluations represent a formal routine that facilitates a 
process-oriented boardroom culture. Having such an evaluation system allows for 
regular follow up on board members contribution to the different board tasks, 
making it easier to detect inefficiencies, and to improve the board work (Lorsch, 
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1995). Board evaluations can be performed in different ways and for different 
purposes, defining different board evaluation systems through the critical questions 
‘who does what for whom and how’ (Huse et al., 2005; Minichilli et al., 2007). Few 
studies have investigated the role of board evaluation in small firms. In small firms, 
board evaluations may help to define board members’ tasks and to enhance the 
relationship between the board and the top management team (Conger et al., 1998; 
Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). Moreover, they make it easier to determine whether 
new resources such as knowledge, skills and relations with external stakeholders are 
needed to improve the board task involvement over time. In this way, board 
evaluations address the possibility that demands and focus of the board work can 
change over time (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003). Based on these arguments we 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H7 There is a positive relationship between regular board evaluation and board 
task involvement.  
 
Methods 
 
A cross-sectional associative research design was used to test the hypotheses. 
We used a sample of 347 Norwegian firms having between five and thirty 
employees. Norway has a one-tier board system for small firms. The system 
generally includes employee representation on boards, and CEO duality is not 
allowed. It is compulsory for the board to delegate the daily operation of the firm to 
a separate management. However, employee representation is not compulsory for 
firms with less than 30 employees, and CEO duality can be practiced in small firms 
with a share capital of less than 3 million Norwegian crowns (about 500,000 USD). 
Most small firms have this option. A detailed description of the sample, the 
variables and validation is found in the appendix.  
 
Variables 
 
Variables in the hypotheses. Three sets of variables were developed to measure 
the hypothesized relationships: 1) the dependent variables measuring board activity 
and task involvement, 2) the ‘usual suspects’ measuring board composition, and 3) 
the board working style variables measuring board member motivation and 
innovative tools to develop good board practices. 
The dependent variable in our hypotheses is board task involvement. Three 
specific board task involvement variables and one summary variable were 
developed. The three specific variables were: control involvement to explore agency 
theory predictions, service involvement to explore resource dependence theory 
predictions and strategy involvement to explore predictions from the resource based 
view of the firm. These three variables are the board involvement tasks that have 
been used the most in earlier research (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The total board task 
involvement was constructed as the mean of the three specific board involvement 
tasks variables. The three specific tasks were made in two steps, and seventeen items 
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employed in various earlier studies were used in developing our board task 
involvement measure. A detailed description of the construction of the variables is 
found in the appendix. 
The term ‘usual suspects’ has been used for the mostly used variables in studies 
of boards of directors. They are: the number of board members, the insider/outsider 
ratio of board members, CEO duality and the shareholding of the board members.  
The board working style variables included measures about board members’ 
motivation, the length of the board meetings and board evaluations. The board 
members’ intrinsic motivation followed measures used in earlier studies about how 
board members are motivated by personal and professional standards to do a good 
job on the board. The length of board meetings was the number of hours that 
ordinary board meetings lasted in 2003. The measure of regular board evaluations 
were taken from a list in the survey containing questions about the implementation 
of good corporate governance practices. 
Boards should not be studied without paying attention to the context of the firms, 
and certain contextual variables are frequently used in board research (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). In this article, we categorize control variables in two groups: board 
external factors and leadership factors. Frequently used board external factors are 
firm size (Brunninge et al., 2006; Huse, 2000), firm crisis (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; 
Mace, 1971), firm age and life cycle (Brunninge et al., 2006), firm international 
activities and industry characteristics (Borch & Huse, 1993; Huse, 1990). 
Leadership factors include CEO characteristics and tenure (Boeker, 1989; 1997), 
ownership (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zahra et al., 
2000), and family involvement (Schulze et al., 2003).  
We included eight contextual control variables in the study. A logarithmic 
transformation of the number of employees was used to measure firm size. Firm 
crisis was measured through a composite index of four items where the CEOs on a 
five-point Likert type scale evaluated the existence of firm crisis during the recent 
three years (alpha .70). Firm age was measured as a logarithmic transformation of 
the number of years the firm, regardless of type of incorporation, had existed. 
International activities variable was the mean of three items about the percentage of 
exports on sales, exports on revenue and working force located abroad (alpha .80). 
One Likert scale type item on expanding industry was used as our industry 
characteristics measure. CEO tenure in present position was our CEO attribute 
variable. The percentage of ownership by the CEO, the top management team and 
their families was used as our ownership variable. Because most small firms are 
family firms (Brunninge et al., 2006), we also included a measure about family 
involvement. The family involvement was measured by a dichotomous variable 
measuring if more generations from the family were involved in the firm. 
The above description reveals that the variables have been exposed to various 
types and degrees of validation. In most cases we used multi-items, and often also 
multi-respondent validation took place. In some cases we also conducted validation 
analyses through other methods and other samples.  
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Analyses and Results 
 
Multiple linear regression analyses were used in testing the hypotheses. Residual 
analyses were conducted, but no results were found that changed the main 
conclusions. Statistical conclusion validity can be found, but inferences to causal 
relationship must only be done with care when using cross-sectional data without 
longitudinal data. Causal relationships will be discussed in the interpretation of the 
results. Correlation coefficients between the independent variables are presented in 
table 1. The results of the linear regression analyses are presented in table 2. Five 
models are displayed in the table. Equation I has the total board task involvement as 
the dependent variable. Equations II, III and IV are sub-models of equation I and 
display the different theoretical perspectives. The dependent variables are board 
control involvement, board service involvement and board strategy involvement. 
Equation V has the number of board meeting as the dependent variable. The partial 
standardized regression coefficients (beta coefficients) for each of the equations in 
the full model are displayed in the table. The table also displays full model equation 
statistics and stepwise statistics. The stepwise statistics displayed are the change in F 
in each step of the analysis. The full model statistics show that all equations are 
significant with R-squares ranging from .47 to .58 and adjusted R-squares ranging 
from .19 to .31. These figures are higher than what is found in most studies on board 
tasks. 
The beta-coefficients for the variables numbered 9-15 correspond to the seven 
hypotheses. The hypotheses about the ‘usual suspects’ (hypotheses 1-4) are not 
supported. Hypothesis 5 about the board members’ intrinsic motivation (beta is .40), 
hypothesis 6 about the length of the board meetings (beta is .11), and hypothesis 7 
about regular board evaluations (beta is .25) are generally supported.  
 
Table 1: Correlation analysis 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
1. Size (ln employees) - -08 22 08 01 00 -23 -03 23 09 -14 -18 01 22 01 
2. Crisis (recent 3 years)  - -14 15 15 -09 -04 -05 02 01 05 01 06 10 -14 
3. Firm age (ln years)   - -05 -22 37 06 17 -01 02 06 02 09 06 -02 
4. International activity    - 11 -05 -21 -09 .01 03 -07 -19 03 -09 -03 
5. Expanding industry     - -10 -05 -00 -04 00 -09 -03 06 04 08 
6. CEO tenure      - 19 16 -15 -14 26 10 13 -09 03 
7. CEO/TMT ownership       - 27 -40 -31 34 62 02 -15 07 
8. Active family generations        - -06 -01 19 30 05 -08 -03 
9. Board members (number)         - 34 -28 -31 -09 17 -03 
10. Outsider ratio          - -16 -19 -11 08 -03 
11. CEO duality           - 24 -06 -13 -02 
12. Board ownership            - -03 -10 01 
13. Intrinsic motivation             - 05 21 
14. Length of meetings              - 06 
15. Board evaluations               - 
 
16. Board meetings (number) 20 14 00 03 11 -06 -31 -15 35 22 -22 -20 00 10 06 
17. Total task involvement -01 -01 -01 -10 14 10 11 -04 -11 -09 -01 10 46 12 36 
18. Control tasks 00 -01 -01 -09 11 13 18 01 -14 -10 06 12 38 00 24 
19. Service tasks -00 02 -03 -05 16 03 04 -03 -08 -08 -02 06 36 15 27 
20. Strategy tasks -04 -01 02 -10 08 08 07 -07 -07 -04 -06 04 39 14 31 
Mean 2.32 1.88 2.83 3.51 2.67 7.92 57.2 .23 3.58 .65 .22 64.6 3.95 2.68 2.69
  
St.dev .62 .91 .87 11.8 1.14 7.27 43.9 .42 1.42 .33 .42 42.1 .96 1.68 1.24 
 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients. All correlations are decimals. Coefficient .10 
= 5% two tailed significance. N=347 
 
Source: Our research 
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Table 2: Regression analyses 
 
Beta coefficients in the 
full model 
I 
Total task 
involvement 
II 
Control 
involvement 
III 
Service 
involvement 
IV 
Strategy 
involvement 
V Number 
of board 
meetings 
Step 1 External factors      
1. Firm size -.005 .065 -.088 -.063 .088+ 
2. Crisis .039 .016 .051 .047 .140** 
3. Age -.046 -.086 -.039 .011 .022 
4. International -.109* -.076 -.076 -.109* -.050 
5. Expanding industry .092+ .073 .102 .040 .092+ 
Step 2 Leadership      
6. CEO tenure .068 .088 .000 .062 .054 
7. CEO ownership (incl 
TMT and family) 
.046 .100 -.023 .051 -.154* 
8. Family generations 
active in firm 
-.089+ -.055 -.037 -.106* -.091+ 
Step 3 Usual suspects      
9. Number of board 
members H1 
-.040 -.033 -.028 -.035 .236*** 
10. Outsider ratio H2 .003 .005 -.040 .026 .082 
11. CEO duality H3 -.017 .033 .004 -.070 -.087 
12. Board ownership 
H4 
.081 .080 .068 .041 .034 
Step 4 Motivation      
13. Board member 
intrinsic motivation H5 
.402*** .338*** .321*** .328*** .007 
Step 5 Board 
structures 
     
14. Length of board 
meetings H6 
.113* .005 .130* .133** -.019 
15. Regular board 
evaluations H7 
.248*** .198*** .199*** .222*** .085 
R .583 .500 .475 .505 .468 
Adj R2 .310 .217 .191 .222 .185 
F (sign) Full model 11.40*** 7.51*** 6.55*** 7.605*** 6.38*** 
F change each step      
Step 1 External factor 2.11+ 1.52 1.88+ 1.34 5.05*** 
Step 2 Leadership 
factors 
3.29+ 6.22*** .48 2.26+ 10.15*** 
Step 3 Usual suspects .99 .60 .77 1.17 7.60*** 
Step 4 Motivation 91.70*** 58.83*** 54.00*** 57.34*** .245 
Step 5 Board structures 17.85*** 8.09*** 11.89*** 14.52*** 1.45 
+ = .1-level ,* = .05-level, ** = .01-level, ***= .001-level 
 
Source: Our research 
 
However, one major difference is found when comparing the different theoretical 
perspectives. The length of the board meetings (hypothesis 6) is not related to the 
control task involvement, but the beta coefficients are significant in the equations for 
the service and strategy task involvement. Hypotheses 1-4 are not supported in any 
of the perspectives, but hypotheses 5 and 7 about motivation and evaluation are 
supported in all of them. 
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A very different picture is found if we measure board activity through the 
number of board meetings instead of board task involvement. The number of board 
members (hypothesis 1) is significantly related to the number of board meetings. We 
also found that some of the control variables were significantly related to the 
number of board meetings. 
The results displayed in table 2 give a very clear picture. First, the figures with 
respect to the board members intrinsic motivation (hypothesis 5) and regular board 
evaluations (hypothesis 7) are extremely strong. The validation of the constructs 
measuring board intrinsic motivation and the existence of regular board evaluations 
were in our study limited, but the results were so strong that we could not see that 
the overall conclusions could be changed. Second, board task involvement and the 
number of board meetings are two very different indications of board activity, and 
what makes boards involved in task performance is very different from what impacts 
the number of board meetings. 
 
Discussion 
 
The purpose of this article was to address the lack of research that explores what 
makes boards in small firms active. In doing this, we went beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’ and investigated how the board members’ intrinsic motivation, the length 
of the board meetings and regular board evaluations influence board task 
involvement.  
Several important observations were made. First, we found that the ‘usual 
suspects’ hardly explained any of the variance in board task involvement in the 
small firms in our study. None of the partial coefficients between the number of 
board members, outsider ratio, CEO duality and the ownership by board members 
were significantly related to any of the board task involvement variables. This 
finding corresponds to results from various meta-analyses in large corporations on 
the impact of the ‘usual suspects’ on firm financial performance (Daily et al., 2003; 
Johnson et al., 1996). Our findings also correspond to the findings of Gabrielsson & 
Winlund (2000) in their study of board control and service involvement in small and 
medium sized firms. We found, however, that the ‘usual suspects’, and in particular 
the number of board members, were related to the number of board meetings.  
A second key finding was the strong result about the board members’ intrinsic 
motivation. This is not surprising when reviewing the literature on boards in large 
firms. It is a major point by various authors, including Fama & Jensen (1983), 
Hermalin & Weisbach (1991, 1998) and Lorsch & MacIver (1989), that there is a 
market for board members, and that this market is a major motivational factor for 
the individual board members. Our study adds interesting evidence from small firms 
to this large-firm focused literature. The work of Westphal & Khanna (2003) on 
social distancing indicates, however, that there will be social pressures on board 
members not to ask discerning questions that will be against the informal norms of 
the ruling elites. We found in our study that personal and professional motivation 
was also significantly related to control involvement. Our findings are similar to the 
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results presented by Borch & Huse (1993) who found that board members’ intrinsic 
motivation had a major impact on board networking involvement. Our findings 
indicate that it is not enough for board members in small firms to be outsiders, to be 
present at board meetings and to have knowledge and skills. They should also, as 
Forbes & Milliken (1999) suggest, be motivated to use it actively in the actual board 
work. The motivation of board members is a challenging and important topic for 
further research. 
A third finding was the impact of regular board evaluations. Board evaluations 
are considered to be a powerful tool to develop boards, and the introduction of 
regular evaluation systems is recommended in most codes of best practices. Few 
studies have empirically shown this impact. Gabrielsson & Winlund (2000), in their 
study of Swedish small and medium-sized firms, did not find any relations between 
formal board evaluations and the boards’ service and control involvement. We 
found, however, that board evaluations have impact regardless of which theoretical 
perspectives is used.  
The greater adoption of board evaluation systems during the five years between 
our study and the Gabrielsson & Winlund (2000) study may account for the 
differences in findings. The variations in results may also be related to how the 
questions were formulated in the studies. Formality and regularity are two different 
aspects of board evaluation systems. Further studies should explore in more detail 
the impact of various elements of board evaluation systems. 
A fourth major finding was the impact of the length of the board meetings. One 
aspect of this finding is that the length of board meetings has an impact on board 
task involvement. Another aspect is that a prescription of effective working style 
will vary with theoretical perspective and board tasks.  
The results indicate that on one side board involvement in strategy and service 
tasks requires long board meetings. On the other side, control involvement seems to 
be independent of the length of the board meetings. This observation brings the 
attention to the inner working of boards and boardroom dynamics.  
This follows conclusions in studies on large firms indicating that boards’ 
contribution in strategy to a large degree depend on creative and interactive board 
meetings where the board involvement goes beyond ratification and output control 
(Hitt et al., 1996; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  
Control activities are less time consuming than the service to top managers or the 
involvement in the strategic process. Control activities typically rely on “hard 
information” readily put together in formal documents and financial reporting and 
budgeting routines. Service and strategy activities are often more ambiguous, 
complex and time-consuming, since they refer to broader issues with general impact 
on the firm and its relation to its environment as suggested by Brunninge et al. 
(2006). The understanding of the boardroom culture and dynamics should receive 
more attention in future studies. 
A fifth finding is the limited explanations found in the contextual control 
variables. This was the case both for the external factors and for the leadership 
factors. Among the few relations observed was the negative relationship between the 
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involvement of several family generations in the firm and strategy involvement. 
Strategic decision-making may in such firms take place in other arenas than the 
boardroom, for example in family councils or informal arenas, such as family 
dinners, coffee breaks, etc. (Nordqvist & Melin, 2002). A negative relationship 
between board task involvement and firm international activities was also indicated. 
Two alternative explanations for this observation should be explored further. First, 
small firms with heavy international activities may be passive subsidiary boards, and 
second, board members may be risk averse and enforce restrictions to creative and 
impulsive managers who want international expansions.  
The limited explanation of the contextual control variables on board task 
involvement was contrasted by their explanation of the number of board meetings. 
Firm size, past crisis, expanding industry, CEO ownership and family generations all 
seem to be related to the number of board meetings. These observations indicate that 
board activity may be influenced by contextual variables, but these variables do 
explain the contribution of board activities. 
We have used an empirical setting from Norway to investigate what makes 
boards in small firms active. It has been assumed that the small firm setting is very 
different compared to the setting of most studies of boards of directors, that is, large 
and publicly traded U.S. corporations.  
Our findings are, however, similar to what could be expected from general board 
task literature and research. This is interesting given the assumed special 
characteristics of small firms, such as overlapping governance structures, lack of 
functional managerial competence and strong owner representation in the 
boardroom and in the top management team (Brunninge et al. 2006; Cowling, 2003). 
Board practices are supposed to vary between large and small firms. Our findings 
suggest that common practices generated from a large firm context also seem to be 
relevant in small firms.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have explored what makes boards in small firms active and we have used 
various theoretical perspectives to understand board task involvement. In line with 
research on large corporation we did not get any support for the four hypotheses 
about the relationships between the ‘usual suspects’ and board task involvement. 
The study illustrates the importance of going beyond the ‘usual suspects’. 
Hypotheses about positive relations between board members’ intrinsic motivation, 
the length of board meetings, and regular board evaluations were supported.  
A theoretical contribution from the study is that few differences existed across 
the various theoretical perspectives. Intrinsic motivation and regular board 
evaluations were positively related to all board tasks. The length of the board 
meetings, however, was not related to the control tasks, and the ‘usual suspects’ 
were not related to any of the tasks.  
The article has various actionable implications for small firm owners and 
managers. Given that motivation has such a high influence on board task 
BOARD TASKS IN SMALL FIRMS 30 
involvement, the selection of outside board members becomes critical. What is 
relevant is not only the appropriateness of board members’ knowledge and skill with 
respect to the requirements from the firm’s competitive environment, but rather the 
use of such skills. Therefore, the selection procedure in small firms should take into 
account elements besides the directors’ competences. In addition to the competence, 
owners of small firms should make sure that the board members are motivated and 
involved. This can be done in different ways.  
One way is to explore to what extent a board member identifies with the goals, 
values and interests of the owners and managers. Given the influence of the owner 
and top managers in small firms, the lack of identification with their goals, values 
and interests is likely to constrain involvement.  
The scheme of incentives for board members’ motivation and commitment 
should also be strengthened by the introduction of regular board evaluations. We 
suggest that boards should regularly evaluate themselves, but also that they 
increasingly let external specialized agents make evaluations that can support board 
development.   
Various directions for further research are possible. First, our results 
emphasizing board members’ intrinsic motivation, process-oriented boardroom 
dynamics and board evaluations should lead to refinements and further 
developments of measures used to explore these concepts. Second, a cross sectional 
associative research design was chosen. Further studies should include longitudinal 
designs.  
Third, the CEOs were the respondents of the main survey in this study. The 
results are as most other survey studies about boards biased in favor of CEO 
perceptions. Future studies should also include responses from other respondents. 
 
 
3.  Appendix: Description of Sample, Variables and Analyses 
 
The sample was taken from a database on boards in small firms. The original 
data was collected in 2004 through an eight page questionnaire where responses 
were collected from CEOs. The questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 
3000 small firms that according to the list of Market Select had between 5 and 30 
employees, and sales between 5 million and 50 million Norwegian crowns (just 
below 1 million and 10 million USD as one Norwegian crown is close to 6 USD). 
There was not an ex ante indication of the existence of boards in the firms. 
Responses were received from 973 firms, and in 498 firms we received questions 
about boards of directors.  
We found that the response rates where slightly related to firm size in two ways. 
1) The total response rates where highest for the smallest firms. 2) The response 
rates on board questions where highest for the largest firms. In our final sample we 
only used responses from firms that reported that they per 1.1.2004 had 5-30 
employees. We found in total 347 firms that had complete responses on all the 39 
board related survey measures we used in our analyses.  
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The study’s measures were validated through responses from a sample of 80 
chairpersons in the firms where there was no CEO duality.  
We also compared our findings with results from another database collected in 
2003 on another sample, mostly on larger and medium sized firms, but some small 
firms were also included. The findings relating to firms with less than 30 employees 
were similar in both surveys.  
 
 
4.  Description of the Sample 
 
The sample consisted of boards in Norwegian firms with 5-30 employees. The 
mean number of employees in the firms was 11.5. The median was 10. Mean sales 
were 21 million Norwegian crowns, while the median 13.5 million crowns (around 
3.5 and 2 million USD).  
Almost four percent of the firms had in 2003 sales of more than 50 million 
crowns (some less than 10 million USD). We found that 9% of the responding firms 
were in the finance and real estate industry, 67% in services, including 24% 
retailing, and 18% were in manufacturing.  
The CEOs responded in 23% of the cases that it was a high-tech firm, and 43% 
of the firms were by the CEOs considered to be a family firm. Families had voting 
control in the boards of 48% of the firms, families were majority owners in 50% of 
the firms, families were represented in the board in 65% of the firms, and owning 
families were in top management positions in 58% of the firms.  
Venture capitalists owned more than ten percent of the shares in nine percent of 
the firms. The mean age of the firms was 25 years and the medium age was 17 
years. The founder was still active in the firm in 62% of the cases.  
 
 
5.  The Variables 
 
Board task involvement: All items were measured on a 5 point Likert type scale 
where 5 was “strongly agree”. We first developed measures of the six subtasks 
presented by Huse (2005).  
Network and resource dependence tasks were measured by two items (alpha .77), 
advisory tasks were measured by four items (alpha .79), output or quantitative 
control tasks were measured by four items (alpha .89), behavioral or qualitative 
control tasks were measured by three items (alpha .84), strategic control tasks were 
measured by two items (alpha .90), and strategic management and mentoring tasks 
(alpha .84) were measured by two items. A confirmatory factor analysis was then 
conducted to validate the three specific board tasks. Results of the factor analysis are 
presented in table 3.  
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Table 3: appendix Board tasks: Factor analysis 
 
      Strategy Control Service 
Network and resource dependence tasks  .19 .16 .54 
Advisory and knowledge based tasks   .26 .39 .70 
Output and quantitative control    .30 .65 .27 
Behavioral and qualitative control   .24 .67 .26 
Strategic control      .84 .27 .29 
Strategy participation and mentoring tasks   .74 .33 .26 
 
Extraction Method: Alpha Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Source: Our research 
 
The results show loadings on factors corresponding to the variables control 
involvement, service involvement and strategy involvement. Convergent and 
discriminant validity are displayed. Board control involvement was thus made as the 
mean of quantitative and qualitative control (mean 3.75, std dev .84), board service 
involvement was made as the mean of networking and advisory tasks (mean 3.21, 
std dev .86) and board strategy involvement was made as the mean of strategic 
control and strategic management (mean 3.36, std dev 1.04). Total board task 
involvement was the mean of board control, service and strategy involvement (mean 
3.44, std dev .75). 
Number of board meetings: The figures were collected through the 
questionnaire. We only included ordinary board meetings in 2003 taking place with 
physical presence of the board members. The mean number of board meetings was 
4.42 (std dev 2.18). The responses from the CEOs were validated through data 
collected from a sample of chairpersons in the same firms. The correlation 
coefficient between the CEOs’ and chairpersons’ responses was .53. 
The ‘usual suspects’: Data on variables were collected from the CEOs’ responses 
from the questionnaire. Our measures included only board members with voting 
rights. The mean number of board members was 3.58. We used NEDs (non-
executive director) ratio on the total number of directors as our measure of outsider 
ratio. NEDs were calculated as the total number of directors minus directors being 
members of the top management team. Employee directors are in our measure 
included as NEDs. The mean NED ratio in the studied firms was .65. CEO duality is 
the case when the CEO also has the position as board chair. It was CEO duality in 
22% of the firms. Ownership by the full board was also collected by the 
questionnaire to the CEOs and validated through responses from the chair on a 
separate questionnaire (corr .69). The mean ownership by the board members was 
65%.  
The board working style variables were single items from the questionnaire to 
the CEOs. A five point Likert type scale was used. The board members’ intrinsic 
motivation followed measures used in earlier studies (Borch & Huse, 1993; Huse, 
1993). Responses were validated through a separate questionnaire to a sample of 
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chairpersons in the same firm. Correlation with responses from chairpersons was 
.32. The length of board meeting was the number of hours ordinary board meetings 
lasted in 2003 (corr .50 with chair responses). The mean length of the board 
meetings was about 2 hours and 40 minutes. The measure of regular board 
evaluations were taken from a list in the survey containing questions about the 
implementation of good corporate governance practices. 
 
 
6.  Statistical Analyses  
 
Various residual tests where conducted to control for how the standard 
regression model was met. Multicollinearity existed only in few cases, and then 
mostly related to family business and ownership issues. Family business issues are 
significant in most small firms. This is displayed in table 1 through the high 
correlation coefficients between CEO/top management team ownership (variable 7) 
and the ownership by the full board (variable 12). There were high correlations 
between the CEO/TMT ownership and the other ‘usual suspect’ board composition 
variables (variables 9, 10 and 11). We also found high correlations between board 
ownership (variable 12) and the number of board members (variable 9), and that 
more generations are active in the firm (variable 8). We observed a high correlation 
between firm age (variable 3) and CEO tenure (variable 6).  
The linear regression analyses were conducted stepwise in order to reduce 
potential flaws based on multicollinearity. In the first step we included the board 
external variables (variables 1-5 in table 1). The CEO and management related 
variables (variables 6-8) were included in step 2. The ‘usual suspect’ board 
composition variables (variables 9-12) were included in step 3. The board intrinsic 
motivation variable (variable 13) was entered in step 4, and the board working 
structure variables (variables 14-15) were included in step 5. When testing the 
hypotheses we thus combined the interpretation of F-change results in the linear 
regression with the beta coefficients in the full model (table 2), and the correlation 
coefficient displayed in table 1. 
A comparison between the beta-coefficients in table 2 and the correlation 
coefficients in table 1 can indicate the existence of multicollinearity. No differences 
were found related to hypotheses 5, 6 and 7. Some of the correlations about the 
number of board meetings related to hypotheses 1-4 that were significant in table 1 
are not significant in the regression analysis (table 2). However, the stepwise 
approach and the changes in F from one step to another reveal that the ‘usual 
suspects’ in sum do not contribute significantly in any of the board task involvement 
equations. However, they do so in the number of board meetings equation.  
The stepwise approach showed an interesting picture. On the one side, step 1 
about external control variables, step 2 about leadership, and step 3 about the ‘usual 
suspects’ (hypotheses 1-4) were not significant in the main equation about total 
board task involvement. However, all three steps were significant in the number of 
board meetings equation. Step 2 about leadership factors was significant in the 
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control task equation. On the other side, both step 4 about motivation (hypothesis 5) 
and step 5 about board structures (hypotheses 6-7) were significant in equation I 
(board task involvement), but not significant in equation V (number of board 
meetings). 
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